Recently, the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice submitted a Statement of Interest in In re: Multiplan Health Insurance Provider Litigation, a class action presently pending before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, to clarify the legal framework governing the use of common pricing algorithms as a potential basis for liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. While the Division expressly disclaimed any position on the ultimate merits of the claims asserted, its filing represents a noteworthy attempt to refine existing jurisprudence concerning concerted action in the context of algorithmic coordination—an area of increasing relevance given the technological modalities that now define many commercial markets.

The underlying litigation involves allegations that a network of health insurers, ostensibly acting in concert through their mutual reliance on pricing determinations generated by MultiPlan, Inc., improperly suppressed reimbursement rates for out-of-network services. The plaintiffs, composed of a diverse number of medical services providers, assert that the uniform adoption of the MultiPlan platform by major insurers resulted in non-transparent, artificially depressed payment rates. Central to their theory is the contention that, by collectively outsourcing the pricing function to a common third-party platform whose algorithm is neither subject to independent oversight nor responsive to market-based reimbursement practices, the defendants effectively abandoned independent decision-making in favor of a coordinated pricing regime.

In moving to dismiss the complaint, the defendants argue—consistent with prevailing precedent interpreting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)—that plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege the existence of concerted action. In their view, the use of a shared platform does not, without more, constitute the type of agreement or understanding necessary to trigger liability under Section 1. The Department of Justice, in its Statement of Interest filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, disagrees with this narrow reading. Drawing upon established authority, including Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), and United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969), the Division takes the position that concerted action may be inferred where competitors knowingly participate in a common scheme that predictably restrains trade—even in the absence of express collusion or direct communication.

The Statement of Interest further distinguishes the present facts from those involving lawful parallel conduct. While the Sherman Act does not prohibit firms from unilaterally adopting similar business practices in response to market conditions, the Division underscores that shared reliance on a centralized pricing algorithm—especially one designed to generate uniform outcomes—can cross the line from lawful parallelism to actionable coordination. The decision to engage a common intermediary, rather than independently assess reimbursement values based on objective medical criteria or market-specific data, may constitute the type of concerted activity condemned by the Act, particularly when all participants are aware of and reliant upon the same opaque mechanism.

This filing is consistent with the Division’s broader enforcement posture in recent years, which reflects heightened scrutiny of the role that algorithms, artificial intelligence, and machine learning may play in facilitating collusive or anticompetitive outcomes. Senior officials within both the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission have repeatedly emphasized that reliance on algorithmic tools does not immunize firms from liability, especially where those tools serve as vehicles for coordinated behavior that would otherwise be impermissible under traditional antitrust doctrines. In public remarks and prior policy statements, the agencies have acknowledged that the shift toward algorithmic pricing has introduced new challenges for antitrust enforcement, requiring a more context-sensitive approach that accounts for the structure, function, and effects of the technology in question.

While the outcome of the Multiplan litigation remains uncertain, the Division’s intervention sends a clear message to the business community: the use of technology to standardize or automate key pricing functions across competitors will not escape scrutiny merely because it lacks the hallmarks of explicit collusion. Instead, courts may properly infer a Section 1 violation where the implementation of such technology reflects a collective abdication of independent judgment and results in coordinated market behavior. This is especially true where the tool itself is structurally predisposed to generate uniform results and where the participating firms are aware—explicitly or constructively—of its anticompetitive potential.

In sum, the Department’s filing advances a coherent and legally grounded theory of harm that aligns with existing precedent while extending its applicability to novel market arrangements. By emphasizing substance over form, the Division reiterates that Section 1’s prohibition on agreements in restraint of trade is flexible enough to reach conduct that, while modern in its execution, is fundamentally antithetical to the preservation of competitive markets. Whether the district court ultimately adopts the Division’s reasoning will bear closely on the development of future antitrust doctrine in the algorithmic age. Yet irrespective of the court’s decision, the Statement of Interest is likely to serve as a reference point in forthcoming enforcement activity—particularly in those industries where algorithmic pricing, third-party platforms, and artificial intelligence tools now play a prominent role in shaping competitive outcomes.