The Justice Department’s foreign bribery resolution with The Scoular Company, an Omaha, Nebraska-based agricultural supply chain company, is one of the more unusual FCPA cases in recent memory. It did not arise from a company chasing a government contract or a licensing decision abroad. It arose from routine cross-border logistics, corn and other agricultural shipments moving from the United States into Mexico, and a bribery scheme built around a single recurring cost: the price of getting a train across the border after a failed inspection. This is Part 1 of a three-part series on the case.

Here, we lay out the settlement terms, the DOJ’s application of its Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy, and a general description of the underlying conduct. Parts 2 and 3 will take a deeper dive into the facts and draw out the compliance lessons.

The Charge and the Resolution

The Justice Department charged Scoular with one count of conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The case, United States v. The Scoular Company, No. 3:26-cr-01685-KC-1, was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, El Paso Division. Scoular resolved the matter through a three-year deferred prosecution agreement.

Under the DPA, Scoular agreed to pay a criminal penalty of $9,769,521 and forfeiture of $414,351, for a total financial resolution of $10,183,872. The company must continue cooperating with the Department in any investigation arising during the three-year term, maintain a compliance and ethics program designed to prevent and detect FCPA and other anti-corruption violations, and periodically report to DOJ on its remediation and implementation efforts. Notably, DOJ did not require an independent compliance monitor. Scoular will instead self-report its progress directly to the Department.

The General Facts

According to court documents, between 2013 and 2019 Scoular relied on multiple customs brokers to move shipments of corn and other agricultural products across the U.S.-Mexico border. Mexican authorities inspected those shipments for dirt, soil, and other impurities. When inspectors found prohibited material, Scoular employees authorized the customs brokers to pay Mexican officials so the trains could cross despite the failed inspections. The brokers generally paid approximately $2,000 per train, and then invoiced Scoular for reimbursement, describing the payments as reinspection fees. Scoular paid those invoices. Employees discussed the shipments and the payments over WhatsApp and other informal communication channels. In total, Scoular authorized more than $400,000 in bribes over the six-year period and avoided more than $6.5 million in fees, delays, and remediation costs it would otherwise have incurred.

DOJ also disclosed an aggravating wrinkle that had nothing to do with Scoular’s own knowledge or intent: a portion of the bribe money ultimately benefited individuals associated with a cartel operating along the U.S.-Mexico border. DOJ was explicit that neither Scoular nor its employees knew about that connection, but prosecutors still treated it as a significant aggravating feature of the offense, tying the case directly to national security concerns about cross-border trade and organized crime.

In a related matter, Carlos Leopoldo Alvelais, one of the customs brokers who made payments on Scoular’s behalf, pleaded guilty in October 2025 to conspiracy to violate the FCPA. His sentencing is scheduled for July 20, 2026.

How DOJ Applied Its Corporate Enforcement Factors

The resolution is a useful case study in how DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy actually operates in practice, because it shows the Department distinguishing carefully between three separate categories of corporate credit: voluntary disclosure, cooperation, and remediation.

Scoular did not receive voluntary self-disclosure credit. DOJ was explicit that the company did not voluntarily and timely disclose the conduct to the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section. That single fact shaped the entire resolution, because voluntary disclosure credit carries the most favorable treatment under DOJ policy, and its absence here meant Scoular was competing for a lesser tier of leniency from the outset.

Scoular did receive credit for cooperation. DOJ cited the company’s internal investigation, its detailed factual presentations, its identification of individuals involved in the misconduct, its production and organization of materials responsive to DOJ’s document requests, and its decision to secure counsel for current employees to facilitate their participation in the investigation. At the same time, DOJ noted “certain deficiencies in the early part of the investigation,” without elaborating on what those deficiencies were. That caveat matters. It signals that Scoular’s cooperation, while ultimately credited, was not viewed as uniformly prompt or complete from day one.

Scoular also received credit for extensive remediation, which we will detail in Part 2, covering restructured compliance functions, new third-party controls, and the outright elimination of the customs brokers associated with the reinspection payments.

Taken together, these factors produced a criminal penalty reflecting a 25 percent reduction from the bottom of the applicable U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range. That is a meaningful discount, but it is a smaller discount than a company with full voluntary disclosure credit could have expected. The gap between what Scoular received and what a timely self-report might have yielded is itself the central lesson of this part of the case, and it sets up the deeper dive into the facts and controls failures that follow in Part 2.