Category: General

Compliance Without Stature: What Bank of America Teaches Us About the Retrenchment of Compliance (Part I of III)

Across corporate America, a quiet retrenchment is under way. Compliance budgets are being flattened or trimmed, headcount is being “optimized,” chief compliance officers are being moved further from the executive suite, and programs built over a decade are being described as overhead to be right-sized. The justification is usually the same: the enforcement climate has changed, so the risk has changed. The Bank of America...

Remediation, Cooperation, and What Every Compliance Program Should Take From the Bank of America Penalties (Part V of V)

Remediation, Cooperation, and What Every Compliance Program Should Take From the Bank of America Penalties (Part V of V)

The first four posts in this series described what went wrong. This one asks what Bank of America is required to do now, how its cooperation and remediation were treated, and what a compliance officer at any institution should do on Monday morning. What the Bank Must Do Under the FinCEN consent order, the bank must work with a third party to complete a lookback...

475 Apparent Violations: OFAC’s $11.66 Million Case Against Bank of America and the Limits of Screening (Part IV of V)

475 Apparent Violations: OFAC’s $11.66 Million Case Against Bank of America and the Limits of Screening (Part IV of V)

On the same day that FinCEN and the OCC announced their penalties, OFAC announced its own: $11,662,930 for 475 apparent violations arising from sanctions screening failures between September 18, 2021 and April 24, 2025. The total value of the apparent violations was approximately $14.8 million. For a bank of this size, the dollar amount is modest. What makes the case important is the base penalty...

“Closure Is Not Supported”: How Revenue Overrode Compliance at Bank of America (Part III of V)

“Closure Is Not Supported”: How Revenue Overrode Compliance at Bank of America (Part III of V)

The most uncomfortable part of FinCEN’s consent order is not the technology. It is the story of what happened when the bank’s own compliance staff concluded that two high-revenue customers were too risky, and the business pushed back. FinCEN uses this history to support its findings on customer due diligence, to establish that management knew of the problem, and to explain why it weighted financial...

Inside the Event Processor: How a Homegrown Monitoring System Missed $5 Billion (Part II of V)

Inside the Event Processor: How a Homegrown Monitoring System Missed $5 Billion (Part II of V)

The core of FinCEN’s case against Bank of America is a single system. The bank’s proprietary transaction monitoring platform, called Event Processor (EP), was its primary control for identifying and reporting suspicious activity. FinCEN’s consent order describes, in unusual detail, how that system was built, what the bank’s own testing said about it, and why the problems persisted for years. For compliance officers, it is...

Bank of America’s $1.21 Billion Day: Three Treasury Actions, One Admission of Willfulness, and What Is Still Missing (Part I of V)

Bank of America’s $1.21 Billion Day: Three Treasury Actions, One Admission of Willfulness, and What Is Still Missing (Part I of V)

On October 13, 2026, the Treasury Department announced what it called the third-largest penalty in its history. Three bureaus, FinCEN, the OCC, and OFAC, resolved overlapping investigations of Bank of America, N.A., the second-largest bank in the United States, in a single coordinated announcement. The headline number is more than $1.21 billion. The structure behind that number, and the admissions attached to it, matter at...

When the Government Wants Out and the Judge Wants Answers: DOJ Takes the Adani Dismissal Fight to the Second Circuit

The Adani prosecution has become one of the most closely watched corruption cases in the country, and not because of the facts alleged in the indictment. It is now a contest over a narrower and more consequential question: when the Justice Department decides it no longer wants to pursue a criminal case, how much of an explanation does a federal court get to demand? On...

Your Employees Are Already Using AI. Where Is Your Policy?

Your Employees Are Already Using AI. Where Is Your Policy?

AI is not coming to your company. It is already there. Employees are drafting emails, summarizing contracts, writing code and analyzing data with AI tools today, many on personal accounts the company never approved. If your organization does not have a responsible AI use policy, you do not have an AI strategy. You have an AI exposure. The Risk Is Not Theoretical The warning signs...

Pick Up the Phone Before the Algorithm Does: DOJ and HHS-OIG Reroute Health Care Fraud Self-Disclosure

Pick Up the Phone Before the Algorithm Does: DOJ and HHS-OIG Reroute Health Care Fraud Self-Disclosure

For years, a healthcare company that discovered possible wrongdoing faced two questions at once: should we tell the government, and which part of the government should hear it first? On October 15, 2026, the Justice Department’s National Fraud Enforcement Division and the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General answered the second question with a joint Policy on Coordination of Voluntary Self-Disclosure...

A $5,950 Sugar Packet Machine and a $175,015 Lesson: OFAC’s Pegasus Worldwide Logistics Settlement

A $5,950 Sugar Packet Machine and a $175,015 Lesson: OFAC’s Pegasus Worldwide Logistics Settlement

On October 9, 2026, OFAC announced a $175,015 settlement with Pegasus Worldwide Logistics, a California freight forwarder of about a dozen employees. The dollar figure is modest, and the shipment at the center of the case was a machine worth $5,950. But the action is one of the clearest recent illustrations of how an ordinary trade transaction becomes a sanctions violation, and it speaks directly...